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Chapter 9
Reforming the German Civil Servant
Pension Plan
Raimond Maurer, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Ralph Rogalla

Throughout the developed world, public sector employees have traditionally been promised a pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) defined benefit (DB) pension
plan. In such a system, current pensions are paid through taxes or contributions made by the working generation. These systems, however, face
increasing financial difficulties, since a shrinking working-age group has to
support more and more retirees. If these developments continue and the
systems remain unaltered, civil servants pension benefits sooner or later
will have to be reduced or contributions increased, in either case requiring
unpopular political decisions. At the same time, it is often argued that
moving public employee pension plans toward funded systems may offer a
resort to the deteriorating financial situation of these plans. The rationale
behind this argument is that accumulating assets and investing them in
the capital markets will strengthen the rights of plan participants, increase
transparency, and might generate enhanced returns, which in turn help to
reduce civil servants’ pension costs. This chapter explores the feasibility of
implementing a funded pension system for German civil servants who have
been promised an unfunded DB plan which faces future shortfalls.
In some countries, civil servant pension plans are well funded, as in
the United States or the Netherlands (Mitchell et al. 2001; ABP 2006).
But German civil servant DB plans are promised benefits related to final
salary and service years, yet few of these promises are backed by assets.
As political decisionmakers have grown more conscious of the economic
costs of public pensions, some action has already been taken. The German
state of Rhineland-Palatinate was the first to introduce a fully funded pension scheme for newly recruited civil servants in 1996, which is currently
endowed with 20–30 percent of the salaries of those covered by the plan.
The state of Saxony followed along these lines and introduced a comparable scheme in 2005, which fully covers all employees who joined civil service
since 1997. Both states essentially restrict their funds’ investment universe
to government bonds, and thereby forego the opportunity to improve the
funds’ financial situation by earning higher returns in equity markets. This
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is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence on international public pension
plans’ investment strategies. For instance, Dutch-based ABP, the pension
fund for those employed by the government and in education, only invests
around 40 percent of plan assets into fixed-income securities, including
a substantial fraction of corporate bonds (ABP 2007). Similar results are
reported for the United States, where state pension plans on average only
invest about one-third of their assets in bonds and other debt instruments
(Wilshire 2007).
As German civil servants pensions are far from being fully funded, and
since in those cases where plans have at least some assets, investment
policies are particularly conservative, more efforts need to be made to
provide political decisionmakers with reliable information on the opportunities and risks associated with moving toward a funded pension system
for civil servants. To this end, this chapter studies the implications of
partially prefunding the civil servants pension plan in the German state
of Hesse. We introduce a hypothetical additional tax-sponsored pension
fund for currently active civil servants, similar to those already introduced
in Rhineland-Palatinate and Saxony. Contributions paid into the fund are
invested in the capital markets and investment returns are used to alleviate
the burden of increasing pension liabilities. Based on stochastic simulations
of future pension plan asset development, we estimate the expectation as
well as the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) of pension costs. These are
then evaluated in an effort to determine the optimal asset allocation that
controls worst-case risks while still offering relief with respect to expected
economic costs of providing the promised pensions.
This study extends prior work by Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008)
in several ways. First, we give a more detailed overview on future structural
changes in the civil service population, which will contribute to a further
deterioration of the public pension plan’s financial situation. Second,
we introduce a more sophisticated stochastic asset model of the vector
autoregression variety which includes stocks, bonds, and real estate as an
alternative asset class available to the plan manager. Finally, we study the
intertemporal risk and return patterns of the suggested investment policy
for current and future taxpayers.
In what follows, we first offer a concise description of the characteristics
of the German civil service pension plan. Next we evaluate future public
plan obligations for taxpayers in a non-stochastic context and derive the
payroll-related deterministic contribution rate that is able to finance accruing pension benefits in the long run. Drawing on these results, we take a
plan manager’s perspective to determine reasonable investment strategies
for accumulating plan assets within a stochastic asset/liability framework.
The final section summarizes findings and their implications for managing
funded public sector pension plans in Germany.
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German civil service pension plan design
Public sector employees constitute about 14 percent of the German workforce, classified into two groups: public employees and civil servants. The
legal status of the roughly 3 million public employees is based on private
sector law, while that of the 1.4 million civil servants is codified in public
law. Initially, the rights and duties of civil servants were codified in the 1792
Prussian General Code, and with some modifications, the basic characteristics of this system are still in force and manifested after World War II in the
German constitution (Gillis 1968). Key components include the fact that
civil servants commit to work for public sector tasks for life, they have no
right to strike, and they are subject to special disciplinary rules. In exchange
for this commitment, the government provides them with an appropriate
salary depending on specific career paths, offers particular pre-entry training, and supplies lifelong health care, disability, and pension benefits. In
contrast to the United States, the legal status, the salary packages, and the
retirement benefits for German civil servants are quite homogenous at the
federal, state, and local levels.
At retirement, German civil servants receive a noncontributory,
tax-sponsored, and cost-of-living-adjusted defined benefit type lifetime
annuity1 which depends on final salary, the number of pensionable years of
service in the public sector, and the retirement age. The noncontributory
plan for civil servants comes at the price of significantly lower gross salaries
compared to other public sector workers with equivalent qualifications.
German civil servants are neither offered complementary occupational
pension plans nor covered by the national social security system.2 Hence,
their retirement benefits are higher than those of private sector workers
who may be eligible for social security as well as supplementary occupational pension benefits (Heubeck and Rürup 2000).
Some argue that the generosity of civil servant pensions serves as partial
compensation for their lack of portability, since accrued pension benefits
are substantially reduced if the worker were to leave public employ.3 Naturally, this substantially reduces turnover, particularly among older civil servants with long tenure. On the other hand, if a civil servant were to change
jobs within the public sector, he would be permitted to remain in the same
pension plan (even when moving from one state to another). From the
plan sponsor’s perspective, the relatively generous but non-portable DB
pension scheme serves as a useful instrument for attracting, recruiting, and
retaining a highly skilled and stable workforce.
Of late, however, German public pension plan generosity has been substantially reduced. In 2003, a new pension benefit formula was introduced
that reduced the retirement benefit formula from 1.875 percent of final
salary per year of service down to 1.79375 percent.4 After a maximum
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of 40 pensionable service years, a retiring civil servant is promised a
maximum replacement rate of 71.75 percent. A surviving spouse receives
survivorship benefits of 55 percent (formerly 60%) of the deceased
civil servant’s pension. Orphans receive 20 percent and half-orphans 12
percent.
Current pensioners, who retired under the old formula with pension
benefits worth 75 percent of their final salaries, will also be affected by
the benefit cut. For several years, their post-retirement benefit increases
will be marginally reduced, until their replacement rate will be cut to the
same 71.75 percent. The nominal pension paid to a retired civil servant will
nonetheless increase over time.
In the past, civil servants’ standard retirement age has been 65, though
they may retire as young as age 63 with a reduction of 0.3 percentage points
per month. Special provisions for public safety workers with physically
demanding jobs like police officers or fire fighters allow for retirement
at earlier ages without a benefit cut. In mid 2007, however, several states
as well as the federal government have followed Germany’s social security
system in moving gradually to 67 as the normal retirement age.

Deterministic valuation of future public
pension obligations
Next we analyze the actuarial status of the civil servants’ pension plan in
the state of Hesse.5 Our prior research has found that already-accrued
public pension liabilities for the state are on the order of 150 percent
of current explicit state debt (Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla 2008); this
analysis assumes that these claims already accumulated will be financed
from other sources. In this section, we conduct a deterministic actuarial
valuation of pension liabilities that will accrue in the future to existing
employees and new hires over the next 50 years.6 We draw on a datafile
provided by the Hessian Statistical Office which contains demographic
and economic information on more than 100,000 active and retired civil
servants in Hesse as of the beginning of 2004, including their age, sex,
marital status, line of service (for active civil servants), and salary/pension
payments. On average, 45 percent of the active workers are female, the average salary (in 2004) is C39,000, and it is a relatively old group, averaging
age 45.
Figure 9-1 depicts the age distribution of the sample of active employees.
This distribution peaks for employees in their late 40s and early 50s. Thus,
in 15 to 20 years’ time, a significant group of civil servants will retire in
a concentrated fashion, and it will result in a jump in required pension
payments. At the same time, there are relatively few active civil servants in
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Figure 9-1 Age distribution of active civil servants in 2004. Note: Age distribution
for all active civil servants (N = 104, 919). Source: Authors’ calculations using 2004
data provided by the German State of Hesse.

their late 50s or early 60s, a pattern attributable to generous early benefits
in the past.
Demographic Assumptions. In what follows, we project pension accruals
of future generations of employees. Our approach is to project the time
path of age and salary for all civil servants through time (we assume that
the marital status remains constant). When a position becomes vacant,
a new civil servant is assumed to be recruited (with equal probability
of being male or female); the new worker’s age is assumed to be the
average age of entering civil service, accounting for average time spent
on position-related education or other types of public service that will be
credited as pensionable years in civil service. The salary of the newly hired
civil servant is assumed to be in line with the age-related remuneration
for the position; the marital status is assumed to be that of the previous position holder. Since turnover other than retirement is virtually nil
we assume no employee turnover prior to retirement; hence we do not
account for early retirement, disability benefits, or dependents’ benefits
due to death in service. In terms of mortality projections, we use those
derived by Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008) who have prepared mortality tables specific to retired German civil servants based on a dataset
for the state of Hesse covering the period 1994 to 2004. They show that
retired civil servants tend to enjoy lower mortality than the overall population. Throughout this study we also employ these tables, accounting
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for decreasing future mortality rates according to the trend functions
published by the German Association of Actuaries (see DAV [2004]). We also
assume that the pension reforms are fully implemented, that is, maximum
benefits only amount to 71.75 percent of final salary and the retirement age
is 67.
Economic Assumptions. Three interrelated economic factors significantly influence the valuation of pension plan liabilities: anticipated inflation, expected salary growth rates, and investment returns on plan assets
(see Hustead and Mitchell [2001]). While Germany has experienced only
moderate inflation over the last decades, it remains an important factor for the valuation of future pension cash flows. For this reason, and
because salaries as well as pensions tend to be maintained in real terms,
this study therefore uses real financial values and investment returns
throughout.
An issue that looms large in the public pension plan arena is what
discount rate one should use in valuing future promised benefits (Waring
2008). Naturally, the discount rate selected directly influences both the
reported pension liability and the contribution rate required to fund
the promises. The current debate coalesces around whether public plans
should use an actuarial versus an economic concept of liabilities.7 Many
actuaries select a discount rate which reflects projected (or historical) asset
returns; accordingly, if a portion of the pension fund is held in equities, the
selected discount rate will include an ex ante risk premium which may not,
in fact, be realized ex post. This approach also tends to downweight future
liabilities and upweight the benefits of investing in stock. By contrast, if
returns are lower than expected, future generations of taxpayers may end
up bearing the investment risk, if actual returns fall below the expected
rates. This strategy is intended to smooth contribution rates required
over time.
By contrast, many economists contend that a public plan should use a
(nearly) risk-free rate on government bonds to compute liabilities, as this
reflects the state’s financing costs. We argue that the risk-less interest rate
must be used for reporting the actuarial present value of pension promises
for accounting purposes and for solvency planning, as well as for setting the
contribution rates. Our simulation assumes that this real risk-free interest
rate is 3 percent for the base case;8 we also evaluate an alternative set of
results with a real interest rate of 1.5 percent. Using a risk-free government
bond rate is consistent with the often-recommended practice of nearly
fully matching public plan assets and liabilities. Nevertheless, this does not
mean that the public entity must, of necessity, automatically invest entirely
in government bonds. Instead, it might be appropriate to invest at least
part of the pension portfolio in more risky equities, depending on the plan
sponsor’s risk preferences.
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Projected future benefits for current and future
civil servants
In order to move the public DB pension plan toward funding, assets need
to be built up and invested in the capital markets to back the accruing
liabilities. Consequently, the plan sponsor’s foremost task is to assess what
contributions are required to finance the benefits based on pension liability
patterns specific to the plan. As pension benefits for Hessian civil servants
are calculated as a percentage of final salary times years of service, the
normal cost of the plan (i.e., the cost accrued in each year supposing
actuarial assumptions are realized) is determined according to the aggregate level percentage of payroll method. Total projected pension plan costs
are stated as a percentage of active members’ overall payroll (McGill et al.
2005); we derive the actuarial present value of future pension benefit obligations (PBO) based on future salaries and service years over the next 50
years (2004–53), evolving our initial population through time in line with
the dynamics discussed earlier. We determine the value of future pension
benefits for active and future civil servants based on the projected benefit
obligation (PBO) formula:
PBO =

 1.79375 · Ùi · S 67,i · ā 67,i
i

(1 + r )67−Agei

(9.1)

where (for each civil servant i of Age i ) Ùi is the number of service years
as of retirement, S67,i is the (expected) salary at retirement age 67, ā67,i is
the immediate pension annuity factor, and r is the discount rate. After 50
years, we assume that the plan is terminated and conduct a discontinuance
valuation.
The relative amount of the present values of pension liabilities to salary
payments represents the deterministic annual contribution rate as a percentage of the payroll required to fund future pension promises.9 In our
non-stochastic analysis, we presume that these contributions are paid into
the pension plan at the beginning of each year. Plan assets are invested
in the capital markets and earn a fixed (i.e., non-stochastic) return equal
to the rate at which plan liabilities are discounted for valuation purposes.
Table 9-1 summarizes the results for our base case with a real discount
rate of 3 percent (Column 1) as well as for our alternative setup, that is,
a discount rate of 1.5 percent (Column 2). The present values of current
workers’ projected pension liabilities and salaries are reported along with
the ratio of the present value of pension costs to salaries and, therefore, the
notional contribution rate required to finance the pension promises.
In our benchmark case with the 3 percent discount rate, the present
value of future pension liabilities comes to C20.8 billion (Row 1,
Column 1), whereas salary payments have a present value of C111.5 billion
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Table 9-1 Projected benefit liabilities and contribution rates:
deterministic model
Discount Rate

(1) PV Pension Liabilities (in bn)
(2) PV Future Salaries (in bn)
(3) Contribution Rate: (1)/(2) (in %)

3%
(1)

1.5%
(2)

20.8
111.5
18.7

44.8
149.3
30.0

Notes: Authors’ calculations using 2004 data provided by the State of Hesse.
Base case defined with a 3% discount rate, alternative case uses 1.5%.
Source: Derived from Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008).

(Row 2, Column 1). The ratio of present values representing the average
required contribution rate is 18.7 percent of salaries for each future year
(Row 3, Column 1). This comes close to the contribution rates for the
civil servants’ pension plan of Rhineland-Palatinate, which range from 20
to 30 percent depending on service level. It comes at no surprise that these
results are highly sensitive to the discount rate applied. A lower discount
rate increases both the present value of pension liabilities as well as the
present value of salary payments. However, as pension liabilities have a
longer duration than salary payments, contribution rates increase with
falling discount rates. In our alternative setting with a real discount rate
of 1.5 percent, the present value of pension liabilities more than doubles
to C44.8 billion while discounted salary payments only increase by less
than 50 percent to C149.3 billion (Rows 1 and 2, Column 2). Hence, the
contribution rate rises to 30 percent (Row 3, Column 2).

Pension plan management in a stochastic
environment
Uncertain capital market returns on pension plan assets are of major concern to DB pension plan sponsors. While market gains may reduce required
contributions and therefore overall plan costs, excessive investment losses
can also require a plan sponsor to make supplementary contributions in
an effort to recover from funding deficits. Selecting an adequate asset
allocation for plan funds is therefore of utmost importance to the plan
manager.
Therefore in this section we evaluate the public plan sponsor’s decisionmaking process, to identify a reasonable plan asset allocation in a
world with uncertain investment returns. This requires formulating an
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intertemporal objective function guiding trade-offs between capital market
risk and returns, as well as between supplementary contributions and cost
savings.
Plan Design, Pension Manager Objectives, and Asset/Liability Modeling.
We minimize the worst-case total cost of running plan over a future longterm time horizon. The funded pension scheme we model is designed as
follows: at the beginning of every period t, regular contributions RC t are
paid into the pension plan by the plan sponsor. These contributions are
determined by a fixed contribution rate CR of 18.7 percent of the current
payroll for all civil servants participating in the plan, as derived in the
previous section. Plan funds are used to pay for pension payments due at
time t, while the remaining assets are invested in the capital markets.
At the end of every period, the plan manager has to analyze the plan’s
funding situation. Depending on the funding ratio, defined as the fraction
of the current projected benefit obligation that is covered by current plan
assets, solvency rules might require additional funds to be paid into the
plan to recover funding deficits. By contrast, substantial overfunding might
allow future contribution rates to be reduced. Specifically, in case the funding ratio in any period drops below 90 percent, immediate supplementary
contributions SC t are required to reestablish a funding ratio of 100 percent.
If, on the other hand, fund assets exceed fund liabilities by more than 20
percent, CR will be cut by 50 percent. In case the funding ratio even rises
above 150 percent, no further regular contributions will be required from
the plan sponsor until the funding level decreases again. At the end of
our projection horizon, we assume the plan is frozen and all liabilities are
transferred to a private insurer together with assets to fund them.
The plan manager’s investment policy aims at generating sufficient
returns in order to reduce overall pension plan costs. At the same time,
he tries to keep capital market fluctuations and thereby worst-case plan
costs under control. Hence, the plan sponsor is interested in identifying
the optimal allocation of pension funds across three broad asset classes: an
equity index fund, a government bond index fund, and a real estate index
fund.10 Specifically, we assume that the plan sponsor seeks to minimize the
worst-case cost of running the plan, specified by the Conditional Value at
Risk at the 5 percent level of the stochastic present value of total pension
costs (TPC).11 The distribution of total discounted pension costs is derived
from running a 10,000 iteration Monte Carlo simulation. Based on this,
we identify the optimal asset allocation x fixed at the beginning of the
projection horizon.12
Total pension costs are the sum of regular contributions (RC) and supplementary contributions (SC) made by the plan sponsor. All payments
by the plan sponsor are discounted at the fixed real interest rate r , which
reflects the government’s financing cost. Thus, the optimization problem
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with respect to the vector of investment weights x (i.e., the fraction of assets
invested in bonds, stocks, and real estate) is specified by:


T

RCt + SCt (1 + Ó)
min C V a R5% TPC =
(9.2)
x
(1 + r )t
t=0
The 5%-Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) is defined as the expected
present value of total pension cost under the condition that its realization
is greater than the Value at Risk (VaR) for that level, that is:
C V a R5% (TPC) = E (TPC |TPC > VaR5% (TPC))

(9.3)

The CVaR framework as a measure of risk is in many ways superior to
the commonly-used VaR measure, defined as P (T P C > V a R· ) = ·, that
is, the costs that will not be exceeded with a given probability of (1 − ·)
percent. In particular, the CVaR focuses not only on a given percentile
of a loss distribution, but also accounts for the magnitude of losses in the
distributional tails beyond this percentile.13
We argue that pension benefits as a rule should be covered by regular plan contributions. Hence, supplementary contributions ought to be
required only as a last resort. In case a plan sponsor is often asked to
make supplementary contributions, regular contribution rates are likely
to be insufficient. To discourage making too few regular contributions,
we include a penalty factor Ó for supplementary contributions. Thus, if
one unit of supplementary contributions is required to recover a funding
deficit, then (1 + Ó) units are accounted for as plan costs. This penalty can
also be interpreted as the additional costs in excess of the risk free rate
of financing the required supplementary contributions, countering the
notion that public monies paid into public pension plans are ‘free’ money.
At the same time, measures need to be taken to discourage overfunding
the plan significantly. The sponsor might find it appealing to excessively
short government bonds and invest the proceeds into the pension plan in
an effort to ‘cash in’ on the equity premium. To this end, we disallow funds
being physically transferred out of the plan; the minimum contribution
rate in any single period is zero. In case plan assets exceed plan liabilities
after plan termination, these funds are lost from the perspective of the plan
manager as they are not accounted for as revenues in his objective function.
Later we relax this assumption.
Stochastic Asset Model. We model the long run stochastic dynamics of
future returns on assets accumulated in the pension plan using a first-order
vector autoregressive (VAR) model, which is widely used by practitioners as
well as in the academic literature (Campbell and Viceira 2002; Hoevenaars,
Molenaar, and Steenkamp 2003). The pension plan’s investment universe
comprises broadly diversified portfolios of equities, bonds, and real estate
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investments. Our asset model draws on the specification employed by
Hoevenaars et al. (2008), who extend the models in Campbell, Chan, and
Viceira (2003) as well as in Campbell and Viceira (2005) by including
additional asset classes, in particular alternative investments like real estate,
commodities, and hedge funds. Following the notation of Hoevenaars et al.
(2008), let z t be the vector
⎞
⎛
r m,t
⎜ st ⎟
⎟
zt = ⎜
(9.4)
⎝ x1,t ⎠
x2,t
that contains the real money market log return at time t(r m,t ), the vector
x1,t , which includes the excess returns of equities and bonds relative to r m,t
(i.e., xi,t = r i,t − r m,t ), the vector x2,t , which includes the excess return of
real estate relative to r m,t , and a vector s t describing state variables that
predict r m,t , x1,t , and x2,t . We include the nominal 3-months interest rate
(r nom ), the dividend-price ratio (dp), and the term spread (spr ) as predicting variables.14
While historical return data are easily available for traditional asset
classes, this does not hold for alternative investments, like real estate in
our case. Typically, return time series for these asset classes are comparably
short. This imposes difficulties when trying to calibrate the model. The
large number of parameters to be estimated can lead to these estimates
being unreliable as data availability is insufficient. To resolve this problem,
restrictions are being imposed on the VAR with respect to x2,t . In particular,
we assume that x2,t has no dynamic feedback on the other variables. In
other words, real estate returns are influenced by the returns on traditional
asset classes and the predictor variables, while these in turn do not depend
on the development of real estate returns. To this end, let y t be the vector
⎛
⎞
r m,t
(9.5)
yt = ⎝ st ⎠
x1,t
The dynamics of y t are assumed to follow an unrestricted VAR(1) according
to
y t+1 = a + By t + εt+1

(9.6)

with εt+1 ∼ N(0, ”ÂÂ ). The return on real estate investments are modeled
according to
x2,t+1 = c + D 0 · y t+1 + D 1 · y t + H · x2,t + Át+1

(9.7)
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with Át+1 ∼ N(0, Ûre ). The innovations εt+1 and Át+1 are assumed to be
uncorrelated, as contemporaneous interrelations are captured by D 0 .
Based on this setup and following Stambaugh (1997), we can then optimally
exploit available data by estimating the unrestricted VAR Equation 9.6
over the complete data sample and by using the smaller sample only for
estimating the parameters in Equation 9.7.
The unrestricted VAR model is calibrated to quarterly logarithmic return
series starting in 1973:I and ending in 2007:I. The real money market
return is the difference between the nominal log 3-months Euribor and
inflation (Fibor is used for the time before Euribor was available). Log
returns on equities and log dividend-price ratios draw on time series data
for the DAX 30 – an index portfolio of German blue chips – provided by
DataStream. We use the approach in Campbell and Viceira (2002) to derive
return series for diversified bond portfolios. The bond return series r n,t+1 is
constructed according to
r n,t+1 =

1
y n−1,t+1 − D n,t (y n−1,t+1 − y n,t )
4

(9.8)

employing 10 year constant maturity yields on German bonds, where y n,t =
ln(1 + Yn,t ) is the n-period maturity bond yield at time t. D n,t is the duration,
which can be approximated by
D n,t =

1 − (1 + Yn,t )−n
1 − (1 + Yn,t )−1

(9.9)

We approximate y n−1,t+1 by y n,t+1 assuming that the term structure is flat
between maturities n − 1 and n,. As for equities, excess returns are calculated by subtracting the log money market return, xb,t = r n,t − r m,t . The
yield spread is computed as the difference between the log 10-year zeros
yield on German government bonds and the log 3-months Euribor, both
provided by Deutsche Bundesbank.
Deriving reliable return time series for real estate as an asset class is
difficult due to the peculiarities of property investments.15 In contrast to
equity and bond indices, inhomogeneity, illiquidity, and infrequent trading
in individual properties result in transaction-based real estate indices not
being able to adequately describe the returns generated in these markets.
Moreover, such price indices do not account for rental income, which
constitutes a significant source of return on real estate investments. By contrast, it is comparably easy to construct indices that try to approximate the
income on direct real estate investments by using the return on investing
indirectly through traded property companies like real estate investment
trusts (REITs). However, empirical evidence on these forms of indirect real
estate investments suggests that they exhibit a more equity-like behavior.16
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These indices are therefore a much less than perfect proxy for direct real
estate investments (see Hoesli and MacGregor [2000]).
Appraisal-based indices, like the one this study draws on, are the most
widely used representatives for real estate investments in the academic
literature as well as among practitioners. These indices account for easy
to sample continuous rental income as well as for returns from changes
in property values, which are estimated through periodic appraisals by real
estate experts. As individual properties’ values are usually estimated only
once a year and due to the fact that there is no single valuation date for
all properties, not every return observation in the index can be substantiated with a new and observation date consistent appraisal of the overall
property portfolio underlying the index. Moreover, annual appraisals often
draw significantly on prior valuations. Consequently, returns derived from
appraisal-based indices exhibit substantial serial correlation and low shortterm volatilities that understate the true volatility of real estate returns.
Different methodologies have been suggested to reduce undue smoothing
in real estate return time series, which subsequently will exhibit more
realistic levels of volatility.17 In this study we employ the approach developed by Blundell and Ward (1987) that suggests transforming the original
(smoothed) return series according to:
r t∗ =

a
rt
−
r t−1
1−a
1−a

(9.10)

where r t∗ represents the unsmoothed return in t and a the coefficient of
first-order autocorrelation in the return time series. Under this transformation, expected returns remain constant, E(r t∗ ) = E(r t ), but the return
standard deviation increases according to:
STD r t∗ = STD (r t )

1 − a2
(1 − a)2

(9.11)

We rely on an appraisal-based index for a diversified property portfolio
as elaborated in Maurer, Reiner, and Sebastian (2003), which provides
quarterly returns on German real estate back to January 1980.The index
is a value weighted index constructed from the returns on German openend real estate funds’ units. These fund units represent portfolios of direct
real estate investments and liquid assets like money market deposits or
short- to medium-term government bonds.18 The return on direct property
investments is then approximated by subtracting from the funds’ returns
their earnings resulting from investing in liquid assets.
While our asset/liability model is run on a yearly basis, the VAR is calibrated to quarterly data, resulting in higher reliability of parameter estimates due to a higher number of available observations. Quarterly returns
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Table 9-2 Simulated parameters for stochastic asset case
Expected Returns (%)

Equities
Bonds
Real Estate

Correlations

Base case
scenario

Low return
scenario

Standard
deviations

Equities

Bonds

Real Estate

6.57
4.08
3.13

5.07
2.58
1.63

23.4
7.02
3.80∗

1
0.17
0.09

1
−0.52

1

∗:

Notes: Unsmoothed volatility following Blundell and Ward (1987). Base case scenario
relates to a discount rate of 3%, low return scenario relates to a discount rate of 1.5%.
See the Appendix for estimated quarterly VAR parameters which generate these moments
based on 10,000 simulations.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

generated by the asset model are aggregated and parameters a, c , Ûre , and
”ÂÂ are adapted so that the model’s simulated empirical return moments
(see Table 9-2 and the Appendix) reflect those of annual historic returns.19
Optimal Asset Allocation under Stochastic Investment Returns. Next we
derive the optimal investment strategy for plan assets assuming that the rate
of regular contributions, CR, is fixed at a given ratio of projected benefit
obligation to the present value of projected future salaries. From Table 9-1
we know that for a real discount rate of 3 percent, a fixed contribution
rate of 18.7 percent of current salaries is sufficient to finance the PBO that
comes to C20.8 billion in the deterministic case. Against this deterministic
PBO and contribution rate, we benchmark our results for an environment
in which investment returns are stochastic. In our base case, we will assume
the same real discount rate of 3 percent and a penalty factor Ó for supplementary contributions of 20 percent. A following section will investigate
into the impact of varying these assumptions.
Table 9-3 summarizes key findings for four distinct asset allocations, the
three polar cases of 100 percent equities, 100 percent bonds, and 100
percent real estate investments as well as the optimal investment strategy,
which is determined endogenously by minimizing the 5%-CVaR of total
pension costs. Panel 1 of Table 9-3 contains the portfolio weights of equities,
bonds, and real estate investments assuming a static asset allocation (Rows 1
to 3), the expected present value of total pension costs (Row 4), and the
5%-Conditional Value at Risk (Row 5). Expectation and 5%-Conditional
Value at Risk of discounted supplementary contributions are shown in
Panel 2 of Table 9-3 (Rows 6 and 7). Figure 9-2 provides closer insight into
the dispersion of possible total pension cost outcomes for the four asset
allocations under investigation, showing box plots of various percentiles of
the overall cost distributions.
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Table 9-3 Risk of alternative asset allocation patterns assuming fixed
contribution rate
Fixed contribution rate: 18.7%
Deterministic PBO: C20.8 bn
Real Discount Rate: 3%
Panel 1
Equity weight (%)
Bond weight (%)
Real estate weight (%)
Expected pension
costs (Cbn)
(5) 5%-CVaR pension
costs ( Cbn)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Panel 2
(6) Exp. suppl.
contributions ( Cbn)
(7) 5%-CVaR suppl.
contrib. ( Cbn)

100%
Equities
(1)

100%
Bonds
(2)

100% Real
Estate (3)

Cost min.
Asset Mix
(4)

100
0
0
21.71

0
100
0
18.62

0
0
100
21.99

22.3
47.2
30.5
16.09

36.27

26.48

25.88

21.02

8.69

1.56

1.43

0.50

21.51

6.74

5.05

2.85

Notes: Contribution rate in % of salaries. Supplementary contributions required in
case of funding ratio (i.e., fund assets/PBO) below 90% to restore funding ratio of
100%. Contribution rate reduced by 50% (100%) in case of funding ratio above 120%
(150%). Opportunity costs of supplementary contributions addressed by accounting
for a penalty of Ó = 20%.
Source: Authors’ calculations using 2004 data provided by the German State of Hesse.

When the fund is fully invested in equities, total expected pension costs
for active employees come to C21.71 billion (Row 4, Column 1) while
the 5%-CVaR amounts to C36.27 billion or about 75 percent higher than
the deterministic PBO benchmark of C20.8 billion (Row 5, Column 1).
In addition to the regular pension contributions of 18.7 percent of the
payroll, taxpayers face another expected C8.69 billion in supplementary
contributions, which rise to C21.51 billion in CVaR (Rows 6 and 7, Column
1). As one would expect, high volatility of investment returns result in high
dispersion of possible cost outcomes. From Figure 9-2 it can be seen that
overall pension costs may vary widely from C12.6 billion (5th percentile)
to C33 billion (95th percentile). Although high return volatility comes
with high expected returns, expected pension costs are substantial due to
the capped upside potential inherent in the plan design. While the plan
manager is fully liable for funding deficits resulting from capital market
losses, he is not able to recover excess funds in an effort to reduce overall
pension costs. Thus, there is a strong disincentive for the plan manager to
overinvest plan funds into equities.
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40

Total pension costs ( bn)

CVaR
95%
30
70%
50%
20
30%

5%
10
100%
Equities

100%
Bonds

100%
Real estate

Optimal
strategy

Figure 9-2 Range of pension costs under alternative asset allocations. Note: Total
pension costs defined as net of regular and supplementary contributions using 3%
discount rate. Annotations refer to the respective percentiles of total pension cost
distributions for various asset allocations. Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

If, on the other hand, plan funds were fully invested in bonds, worstcase pension costs would only come to C26.48 billion, while expected costs
would even drop to C18.62 billion (Rows 4 and 5, Column 2). Expected
returns are moderate and therefore the cap on excess fund withdrawal is
only of minor relevance. However, returns are still sufficient to earn some
excess income over the discount rate, cutting expected costs down below
their deterministic value. Lower volatility of investment returns results
in lower dispersion of costs, ranging from C13.5 billion (5th percentile)
to C24.6 billion (95th percentile). This keeps worst-case pension costs
under control. On average, only C1.56 billion in supplementary contributions are required while their 5%-CVaR amounts to C6.74 billion, less
than one-third compared to the all-equities allocation (Rows 6 and 7,
Column 2).
Column 3 of Table 9-3 presents the results for an investment strategy
that allocates all plan funds to real estate, the least risky single asset class
under consideration in this study. Consequently, with an overall amount
of C25.88 billion, worst-case pension costs are the lowest compared to
the other polar cases (Row 5, Column 3). This also holds for expected
and worst-case supplementary contributions, which come to C1.42 billion
and C5.05 billion, respectively (Rows 6 and 7, Column 3). Low investment risk, however, comes at the cost of low expected returns. Real estate
investments hardly outperform the fixed discount rate. Thus, there is not
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much of a risk premium to cash in and the upside potential is heavily
limited. Expected pension costs amount to C21.99 billion, which exceeds
those in the other polar cases as well as the deterministic PBO (Row 4,
Column 3).
The optimal investment strategy given the fixed contribution rate of
18.7 percent of salaries is depicted in Column 4 of Table 9-3. It consists
of 22.3 percent equities, 47.2 percent bonds, and 30.5 percent real estate
investments (Rows 1–3). Equities acquire a significant share in the optimal
portfolio, indicating that current investment policy for the few funded
German pension schemes, that is, only investing in pure bond portfolios,
might not be a favorable solution. Nonetheless, optimal equity weights
are considerably lower than the almost 60 percent reported for US state
pension plans (Wilshire 2007). Allocating a substantial fraction of assets to
real estate is in line with the results of Ziobrowski and Ziobrowski (1997)
and Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler (1988), among others. In a more recent
study however, Craft (2001) argues that in an asset/liability framework
allocations to private real estate investments should only range from 12 to
16 percent. This is more in line with empirical observations of real estate
allocations varying between 5 and 10 percent (see Wilshire [2007]; ABP
[2007]). To a certain extent, the relatively high allocation to real estate in
this study may be attributed to the underlying pension plan design. Due to
the pension plan’s up-side potential being restricted for political reasons,
the plan manager will favor more stable real estate investments compared
to riskier assets like equities.
Given the optimal investment strategy, expected pension costs for active
employees are reduced to only C16.09 billion (Row 4, Column 4), more
than 20 percent below the C20.8 billion required in the deterministic case.
This cost reduction can directly be attributed to the considerable benefits,
which can be expected from investing in diversified portfolios. From the
outset, the fund is endowed with 18.7 percent of payroll, while actual
pension payments are initially negligible. Expected returns well above the
discount rate at which the benchmark contribution rate was derived and
moderate return volatilities enable the fund to quickly accumulate considerable assets. The possibility of being able to reduce the actual contribution
rate increases through time, while the risk of having to make supplementary contributions to reduce funding deficits diminishes.
This optimal funding and investment strategy also keeps worst-case risk
under control. The 5%-Conditional Value at Risk of total pension costs,
or the expected cost in the 5 percent worst cases, only amounts to C21.02
billion (Row 5, Column 4), almost equal to the deterministic benchmark.
Supplementary contributions are also low. Their present value only comes
to C500 million in expectation and even in the worst case—again defined
as the 5%-CVaR—they only amount to C2.85 billion, slightly more than
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half the cost that was reported for the least risky pure real estate investment
(Rows 6 and 7, Column 4).
The benefit of diversification can also be seen in Figure 9-2 with pension
costs for the optimal asset allocation ranging from C12.5 billion (5th percentile) to C20 billion (95th percentile). This range is smaller than for pure
equity or bond investments, while investing only in real estate will result in
an even smaller range. However, the overall level of costs resulting from
following the optimal strategy is substantially lower compared to the pure
real estate investment case. Only investing in real estate will result in the
5th percentile of overall costs being only marginally lower than the 95th
percentile of costs in the optimal case.
As a result, introducing an at least partially funded public pension plan
that follows an optimized investment policy could be expected to substantially reduce the economic cost of providing covered pensions, while
simultaneously keeping the consequences of capital market volatility under
control.
Figure 9-3 provides deeper insight into the temporal structure of risks
and rewards of following the cost minimizing investment strategy (i.e., 22%
stocks, 47% bonds, 31% real estate). Panel A depicts the time path of
the probability of having to make supplementary contributions due to
substantial underfunding resulting from unfavorable investment returns
(solid line). It indicates that there is a relatively low risk of additional contributions in the first decade of operations (much less than 10% probability),
and a negligible risk thereafter. The other two lines depict the probability
of the regular contribution rate being reduced by 50 (dashed line) or even
100 percent (dotted line). It can be seen that the probability of enjoying
partial or full contribution holidays because of overfunding rises with time.
Ten years into the program, the probability of a contribution holiday is
only 2 percent, but 35 percent after 20 years. In other words, the risk of
additional contributions is front-loaded, but the potential benefits savings
are back-loaded.
Panel B of Figure 9-3 indicates that the expected value of required
supplementary contributions (solid line) is highest at 12 years, where it
amounts to C40 million (the dotted line represents expected savings due
to contribution holidays). Ten years after the program is launched, the
expected savings amount to C8.3 million, and rise to C145 (578) million in
year 20 (40). The dashed line shows our estimate of the ‘worst case’ value
of supplementary contributions measured by the 5%-CVaR risk metric.
This suggests that, with a low probability, the plan sponsor might have to
contribute substantially more during the early period: C800 million at the
10 year mark, and C360 million after 20 years. Reinforcing the message
of Panel A, the optimal investment strategy greatly reduces the burden on
future generations while controlling the risk on current contributors.
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Figure 9-3 Time paths of supplementary public pension contributions and cost
savings under optimal asset allocation strategy. Panel A. Probabilities of supplementary contributions and contribution holidays over time. Panel B. Magnitudes (in
billions of 2004 euros) of expected supplementary contributions and cost saving
due to contribution holidays. Note: P(SC): probability of supplementary contributions being required in any period. P(CR = 50%)/P(CR = 0%): probability of
regular contribution rate being reduced to 50%/0%. Exp. SC: expected value of
supplementary contributions in any given period. 5%-CVaR SC: ‘worst case’ value
of supplementary contributions in any given period. Exp. Savings: expected value of
cost savings due to cuts in contribution rates in any given period. Source: Authors’
calculations; see text.
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Further Results. Naturally, the results derived so far depend on model
calibration. To check for robustness, we have analyzed optimal pension
fund investment strategies for a selection of alternative parameterizations.
While it is impossible to investigate all sensitivities, the findings presented in
the following text provide a good understanding of the basic interrelations.
Results are summarized in Table 9-4 for three alternative parameter sets.
For ease of comparison, Column 1 repeats the result derived earlier for
our base case. Alternative A investigates the impact of the penalty factor
on supplementary contributions by redoing the analysis using a penalty
factor for supplementary contributions of Ó = 0 (Column 2). We then study
the influence of expected asset returns on the optimal asset allocation
(Alternative B, Column 3). To this end, we analyze the plan assuming a real
discount rate of 1.5 percent (instead of the 3% in our base case) together
with the low return scenario from Table 9-2. Finally, we ease the restriction
on withdrawing assets from the pension plan in an extremely overfunded
situation by imposing a small cost on withdrawals (Alternative C, Column
4). Panel 1 of Table 9-4 presents optimal investment weights into equities,
bonds, and real estate (Rows 1–3), as well as the expectation and the 5%CVaR of the present value of total pension costs (Rows 4 and 5). Rows 6
and 7 in Panel 2 again present the expectation and worst-case realization
of the present value of supplementary contributions. Finally, Rows 8 and 9
present the expected value as well as the 5%-CVaR of withdrawals from the
pension plan.
In our base case, we levy a penalty of 20 percent on supplementary
contributions, giving plan managers an incentive to follow a sustainable
investment policy, which only relies on extra payments as a last resort.
Moreover, this penalty was introduced to support the notion that such
payments do not come for free but rather involve some form of financing
costs. If supplementary contributions were free of extra costs, the plan
manager would engage in a more risky investment strategy. Under these
circumstances (Column 2, Rows 1–3), low risk real estate investments would
be significantly reduced by more than 6 percentage points to an overall investment weight of 24.2 percent, while the weights of equities and
bonds would both increase by about 3 percentage points to 25.6 percent
and 50.2 percent, respectively. Equity exposure, however, continues to be
comparably low, since the plan’s upside potential is still limited. Having
to account for such a penalty increases overall pension costs. Hence, it
comes at no surprise that reducing the penalty factor will automatically
reduce plan costs. For a penalty factor of 0 percent, expected plan costs
come to C15.6 billion, while their worst-case value amounts to C20.5 billion
(Column 2, Rows 4 and 5). Both figures are about C500 million below the
ones reported for a penalty factor of 20 percent. Expected and worst-case
supplementary contributions in Rows 6 and 7 of Column 2 are also lower
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funds exceeding 180% of pension liabilities (subject to respective penalty factor).
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Table 9-4 Optimal asset allocation patterns for alternative parameterizations
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than their counterparts in our base case (Column 1). Their decrease due to
the reduced penalty factor, however, falls short of the 20 percent one might
expect. This results from the slightly more aggressive optimal investment
policy.
Discounting pension liabilities with a reduced real rate of 1.5 percent
increases the deterministic PBO to C44.8 billion and the corresponding
contribution rate to 30 percent of the payroll (Table 9-1, Column 2, Rows
2 and 3). Assuming that expected returns on assets drop by the same
1.5 percent, the optimal asset allocation will generate worst-case costs of
C44.79 billion (Row 5 Column 3), virtually equal to the deterministic PBO.
Expected pension costs come to C33.65 billion, down 25 percent compared
to their non-stochastic counterpart (Row 4, Column 3). The optimal asset
allocation consists of 22.5 percent equities, 47.5 percent bonds, and 30
percent real estate (Column 3, Rows 1–3). In essence, this equals the
optimal allocation in our base case. The weight of real estate is marginally
reduced by 0.5 percentage points, which are evenly distributed to equities
and bonds. Thus, the interrelations between the asset classes as well as
between plan assets and plan liabilities and the overall plan design determine optimal portfolio weights to a far greater extent than the absolute
level of investment returns.
Finally we allow the plan manager to almost completely participate in
the upside potential of investing plan assets more aggressively into equities.
This alternative permits the plan manager to recover assets that exceed
liabilities by more than 80 percent.20 To prevent the manager from treating
the pension as a hedge fund, we levy a 20 percent penalty on withdrawals.
Now, investing in equities becomes much more appealing to the plan
manager, as he is now rewarded for accepting higher return volatility with
higher expected investment returns. Equity weights in the optimal portfolio rise by more than 30 percentage points to about 53 percent (Row
1, Column 4). While bond holdings remain virtually constant, assets are
no longer invested into real estate due to their lack of expected return
(Column 4, Rows 2 and 3). As expected investment returns significantly
outperform the discount rate at which plan liabilities are valued, pension
costs decrease substantially. In expectation, the plan exhibits negative pension costs of C2.46 billion (Row 4, Column 4). This means that after initially
paying contributions into the plan for some years, investment returns on
accumulated plan funds are sufficient to finance ongoing pension payments and even allow withdrawals that exceed earlier contributions in
present value terms. Withdrawals come to C17.4 billion in expectation,
and even in the worst case, almost C3.5 billion can be withdrawn from the
plan (Rows 8 and 9, Column 4). Worst-case risks in this scenario are also
well under control. While worst-case supplementary contributions come
to C6.71 billion, more than double the amount of the base case (Row 7,
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Columns 1 and 4), and the 5%-CVaR of total pension only amounts to
C16 billion, 20 percent less than the deterministic pension cost (Row 5,
Column 4).

Conclusion
As in many countries, civil servants in Germany are promised an unfunded
DB pension. These benefits represent a significant liability to taxpayers,
one which is currently not recognized as explicit state debt. We analyze the
implications of moving Hesse’s civil servants pension plan toward funding.
We focus only on future benefit accruals, assuming that pensions paid to
current retirees as well as claims already accumulated by active civil servants
will be financed from other sources. With a non-stochastic framework based
on a real discount rate of 3 percent, the annual contribution rate would
be around 19 percent of salary which would be sufficient to cover future
benefit accruals. Drawing on these results, we scrutinize alternative asset
allocation strategies within a stochastic asset/liability framework. Here, we
seek to minimize the worst-case costs of providing the promised pensions.
In our base case, we find that, given the contribution rate of about 19
percent, the optimal investment policy for pension plan assets comprises
22 percent equities, 47 percent bonds, and about 31 percent real estate
investments. Following this funding and investment policy will curtail worstcase pension costs to the deterministic PBO, while expected costs fall below
these by almost 25 percent.
These results indicate that moving toward a funded pension system for
German civil servants could be beneficial to both taxpayers as well as
employees. Taxpayers can expect substantial cost reductions due to the
favorable impact of earning investment returns in the capital markets, while
their exposure to investment risks is limited for reasonable investment policies. Civil servants, in turn, benefit from being less exposed to discretionary
pension cuts in times of tight government’s budgets. Additionally, they
might enjoy greater flexibility as pension claims backed by assets are much
more portable than unfunded promises. Finally, we argue that public plans
that hold 60 percent or more in equities, as is true in the US public case, is
likely too aggressive. Nevertheless, investing in pure bond portfolios as in
the few German pension schemes that hold some assets provides stability,
but can be quite expensive.
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Appendix
Table 9-A1 Estimated quarterly VAR parameters
r m,t

xe ,t

xb,t

d pt

s pr t

r nom,t

Parameter estimates
0.0035 −0.0226 −0.2118 −0.0350 0.5455
rm,t + 1 −0.0338
0.1267
0.0116 0.0920 1.9727 0.5572 −2.8218
xe,t + 1
xb,t + 1 −0.1710 −0.0176 0.1106 −0.3946 0.9146 1.5958
0.0012 −0.0094 0.9274 −0.0169 0.0464
dpt + 1 −0.0099
0.0467
0.0005 0.0458 −0.0196 0.9729 0.3110
sprt + 1
0.0010 −0.0173 0.0434 −0.0869 0.7718
rnom,t + 1 −0.0268
−0.1218 −0.0068 −0.2699 −0.3993 −0.2348 −0.5134
D0
−0.0915 −0.0073 −0.0033 0.1551 0.3570 0.3802
D1
Error correlation matrix
0.54
rm,t
−0.05
11.55
xe,t
0.19
−0.07
xb,t
0.06
−0.87
dpt
0.01
0.05
sprt
0.21
−0.16
rnom,t
H
−0.4897
0.0065
Ûre

3.00
0.12
−0.42
0.12

0.30
−0.10
0.23

0.62
−0.35

0.15

Source: Authors’ calculations; see text.

Notes
1

2

3

To be precise, the benefits of retired civil servants are adjusted according to the
general salary increase of active civil servants.
Civil servants are exempt from unemployment insurance and the state covers
a certain fraction of health care expenses for civil servants and their families.
These fractions range from 50—85 percent, depending on family status, number
of children, and state (Börsch-Supan and Wilke 2003).
If, for example, a civil servant were to quit service and take a job in the private
sector, he would sacrifice about 50 percent of his accrued pension claims. In
this case, the state pays the employee’s foregone employer contributions to the
national social security system.
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4

5

6

7
8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

To compensate for this cut in pension benefits, civil servants are allowed to
(voluntarily) invest up to 4 percent of their salary (with a ceiling of C2,100
per year) into tax sponsored personal retirement account also known as ‘Riester
accounts’; see Maurer and Schlag (2003).
Being part of former West Germany, Hesse’s civil service population appears
to be rather representative of the approximately 1.5 million active (which is
about 4.5 percent of the German workforce) and 900,000 retired civil servants in
Germany as a whole; this section draws on Maurer, Mitchell, and Rogalla (2008).
This time horizon could be easily extended, but after 50 years, all active workers
will be fully included in the new funded system.
See Blake (2006), Gold (2003), and Waring (2008).
The difference between the average nominal par yield of long term German government bonds and the average inflation rate for the post-World War II period
is about 4 percent. Inflation protected bonds in the Eurozone currently yield
about 2 percent. This market is currently not well developed for government
bonds (especially those with long durations) which supports the assumption of a
real interest rate of 3 percent.
As noted above, we set aside pension benefits of current retirees as well as those
already accumulated by currently active civil servants and assume that these will
be covered by some other financing arrangement. Thus, only future benefit
accruals by active civil servants will be covered by this scheme.
We assume investments in index funds to prevent the state from systematically
influencing asset prices.
For a comparable objective function using the Value at Risk see Albrecht et al.
(2006).
We deliberately do not dynamically optimize investment weights and contribution rates over time. While this might by appealing from a theoretical perspective, political decision makers will most likely be unable to implement this in
practice. Moreover, empirical evidence on pension plan asset allocation suggests
that investment weights are rather constant in real-world pension schemes (see
Haberman et al. [2003]).
For a detailed discussion of the advantages of the CVaR over the more widely
acknowledged VaR see, for example, Artzner et al. (1997, 1999) and Rockafellar
and Uryasev (2002).
The state variables included here are commonly used in the strategic asset allocation literature (see e.g., Campbell and Shiller [1988, 1991]; Fama and French
[1989]; Campbell, Chan, and Viceira [2003]; Campbell and Viceira [2005];
Cochrane [2005]; Brandt and Santa-Clara [2006]).
For an extensive discussion of design and characteristics of real estate indices
we refer to—among others—Hoesli and MacGregor (2000) and Albrecht and
Maurer (2005).
In a survey by Eichholtz (1997), correlations between common equities and
property company shares range from 0.12 to 0.96.
Other methods to unsmooth real estate return time series have been suggested
by—among others—Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler (1988), Ross and Zisler (1991),
Geltner (1993), Fisher, Geltner, and Webb (1994), and Barkham and Geltner
(1994).
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20

A thorough analysis of the institutional design of German open-end real estate
funds, as well as their risk and return profile can be found in Maurer, Reiner, and
Rogalla (2004).
Mean real log returns on bonds in our time series come to almost 5 percent
per year while equities only yield an excess return of 1.5 percent. We reduce
expected bond returns to 4 percent, considering this to be more appropriate in
the long term.
Formally, we expand the total pension cost in Formula 2 to T P C = ”(RC t + (1 +
Ó1 ) · SC t − (1 − Ó2 ) · Wt ), where Wt are the withdrawals in the case of a funding
ratio higher than 180 percent and Ó2 is the penalty factor.
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